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Orestis Papadopoulos*
ECONOMIC CRISIS­
AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT:­
THE GREEK CASE
Young people have been hard hit by the crisis and the austerity
measures implemented in Greece since 2010. After six years of signi­-
ficant changes in the Greek employment and social system young
people face burgeoning difficulties to find quality and well-paid
jobs while the proliferation of flexible and insecure ones has taken
an epidemic form. This article presents the labour market reforms
im­plemented in Greece and shows that these reforms have shifted
the bargaining power in favor of employers as labour power has be­-
come rather cheap, flexible and adaptable. The narrative that flexi­-
bilization will assist economic growth and generate quality jobs seems
to be fading away since most newly created jobs are temporary,
part-time and low-paid. The dismantling of collective agreements
and labour laws through which young employees used to guaran-
tee some protection has meant that poverty, insecurity and depri­-
vation have become persistent features of their social existence.
* Lecturer at the Management School, Keele University, UK <o.papa­-
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Introduction 
The crisis­that erupted in Greece in 2009 has prompted an unpre­-
ce­dented social and humanitarian crisis whose exact proportions
can be hardly measured due to the ongoing nature of the crisis
and austerity measures. The widespread feeling, cultivated main-
ly by Syriza, in the Greek society that austerity could end through
a different management of the crisis based on social justice, so-
cial-democratic principles and eradication of neo-liberal poli-
cies has faded away. This discourse attracted much support as
evidenced by the rise of Syriza to power in January 2015. Syriza
enacted a Third Memorandum in August 2015 accompanied by
more austerity measures and harsh institutional reforms – re-
cently approved by the coalition government and the main op-
position parties. Thus, despite fierce rhetorical opposition to
the previous two Memorandum Agreements and the repetitive
pledges to oppose austerity, Syriza is now often praised by Eu-
ropean leaders for its commitment to implementing harsh re-
forms (thetoc.gr. 2016). The legislative framework introduced
by the first and second Memoranda has been left intact by Sy­-
riza while there is a widespread concern that the completion
of the ongoing second review of the Greek Program will be ac-
companied with substantial changes in the employment rela-
tions framework with a focus on further reductions in wages (for
young people) and amendments in trade unions’ rights. These
developments have caused feelings of distrust in wider strata
of the Greek society but so far only a minority of people have
actively resisted the proposed reforms (iefimerida 2016). One
segment of the Greek population that has been hard hit by
the crisis and the labour market reforms is young people. This
article aims to shed some light on the policies implemented in
Greece for young people and assess how these policies affect
the social and employment conditions of the young generation.
In addition to that, the article aims to identify how and whe­-
ther collective organizations (mainly unions) have produced
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any response to the deterioration of young people’s social and
working lives. 
Economic Crisis and Youth Unemployment
The eruption of the economic crisis in 2008 has caused a seve­-
re unemployment crisis as many employees have been made re-
dundant and at the same time the possibilities of finding a new
job have been seriously undermined by the extended period of
crisis (Eurostat 2012). Although the crisis has widespread ef-
fects on labour market, some segments such as young people
have been especially hard hit as their unemployment rates have
increased dramatically and their labour market position has
deteriorated across socio-economic settings (Scarpetta et al.
2010; Dietrich 2013). Evidence provided by Eurostat (2016) has
shown that young people’s unemployment rates have increased
more than those of their adult counterparts. In EU as a whole
(EU-27), youth unemployment rates for those aged 15-24 stood
at 20.2% in 2015 when in 2008 the unemployment figure was
15.6%. Similarly, the employment rates for the 15-24 age group
has decreased from 37.3% in 2008 to 33.2% in 2015. While there
are significant differences between member states’ youth unem-
ployment and employment rates, the number of EU jobless young
people is rather high across the continent, posing questions re-
garding the validity of EU and national narratives that growth
is positively related with jobs and especially good quality ones.
The increasing rise of flexible employment contracts even in
countries with high economic growth (Germany, United King-
dom) casts additional doubts on the view that economic growth
is equated with the entrance of young people in secure and well-
paid jobs (Guardian 2016). This insecure situation is exacer-
bated by the increasing incidence of inactiveness among young
people across many EU countries. According to Eurostat (2016),
in 2013 among young people aged 15-24 thirteen percent were
not in employment, education or training (NEETS) while for the
25-29 age group one in three (30%) belonged to that category.
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These developments have raised concerns among European
politicians and employers since a significant part of the young
generation is excluded from the labour market for long periods
of time with potentially detrimental effects in terms of skills
availability for businesses, growth for economies and social co-
hesion for societies (Eurostat 2015: 162). The likelihood of gene­-
rating disruptive and uncontrolled waves of violence due to the
anger and distress of young people is one of the concerns expres­-
sed by national governments and international organizations.
However, the dilemma facing national states and businesses is
that the deregulation and austerity policies pursued as a respon­-
se to increased international competition has a twofold contra­-
diction; they might achieve the reduction of labour costs and
the rise of profitability levels but at the same time they are ac-
companied with unemployment, insecure and flexible forms of
employment and social exclusion. Thus, the narrative that la­-
bour market reforms are a precondition of economic growth and
social prosperity widely used by EU and national governments
is seriously undermined by the realities of young Europeans as
these have been reported by the EU statistical authorities them-
selves. These realities remind us that economic growth is not
a neutral economic outcome but is built upon certain socio-hi­-
storical conditions (capital-labour relations) and political arran­-
gements that prevent the economic outcomes to be equally and
fairly distributed despite pronounced political narratives and obje­-
ctives. In a context of fierce global competition, affected by the
increased difficulties for overcoming the economic crisis, the
political management of the crisis is mainly concerned with se­-
curing a more favourable environment for investments and growth
whose translation in social and employment spheres is the fur-
ther squeezing of established social and employment rights. In
the field of youth employment, the above-mentioned political
and economic developments have been materialized in the rise
of a precarious young generation whose labour market status is
very often locked in a successive wave of transitions from un-
employment to employment or training and backwards. The
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available data show that part-time and temporary jobs are on the
rise across the EU (EU-27) as in 2015 almost half of those aged
15-24 are employed on temporary contracts while one in three
are on part-time jobs. The proliferation of flexible patterns of
work in combination with the dominance of vocational training
programs show that for many young people exploitative wor­-
king relations and absence of standardised employment patterns
will not be a transient and ‘in-between’ liminal passage but rather
‘a permanent temporariness’ whose full consequences will be
unfolded in the form of increased working poverty, marginaliza-
tion and exclusion (Papadopoulos & Bithymitris forthcoming). 
The Greek youth employment and social model
Greece has been traditionally associated with high employment
protection legislation and very rigid youth labor markets that pre-
vent young people from securing a job. According to Dedou­-
sopoulos et al. (2013), the high level of Employment Protection
Legislation (EPL) mainly materialized through high levels of re-
dundancy payments that were paid is compensated by the low
social protection provided through unemployment benefits.
However, despite the relatively high EPL index and the domi-
nance of the breadwinner male model, many scholars recognize
that the Greek youth labor market has been dominated by very
flexible arrangements, violation of labor rights, and high pre-
cariousness and insecurity for young workers (Kretsos 2014: 38).
The specific phenomena are directly linked to some basic fea-
tures of the Greek economy such as the large unregulated in-
formal sector, the high percentage of small firms, and the frag-
mentation characterizing the Greek labor market (Zamparlouk-
ou 2007; Gialis & Leontidou 2014). Seferiades (2003) argues that
high levels of informal flexibility and relatively low labour co­-
sts, combined with high unemployment rates, provide little evi­-
dence for legitimizing the argument that the Greek labour mar-
ket is in need of further flexibilization. 
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In terms of the ways that the Greek Welfare State has been
conceptualized it is worth mentioning that Greece has been
categorized in the Mediterranean welfare state type. The inade­-
quate social support and the absence of any social protection
for specific groups such as young unemployed people (without
social contributions record) has prompted scholars (Gallie &
Paugman 2000; Papadopoulos 2006) to categorize the Greek sys-
tem as a sub-protective type of welfare regime with a highly
exclusive character as far as unemployed youth are concerned.
According to academic scholarship (Matsaganis et al. 2003;
Pohl & Walther 2007), the welfare state arrangements in rela-
tion to the entitlements of Greek young people to state social
protection classify Greece into the ‘de facto no entitlement’ wel-
fare regime whereby young unemployed people are completely
unprotected and primarily rely on family support. The Southern
European welfare regime is also characterized by low expendi­-
ture on vocational training and education while activation poli-
cies, despite their recent emergence, have been limited.
The post-crisis context of  labour market 
interventions for young people
The Greek employment framework has been amended to such
an extent that the pre-crisis protections provided to Greek
workers either through collective agreements or labour law have
been curtailed and in many cases just abolished (Koukiadaki
& Kokkinou 2016). The new employment regime produced by
the successive waves of labour market reforms has been trans-
lated into an extreme flexibilization of the labour market al-
lowing businesses to overcome a series of institutional ‘rigidi-
ties’ that used to protect employees. More specifically, the dis-
mantling of the pre-crisis employment model was triggered by
a series of legislative acts whose common denominator was the
creation of a very flexible landscape with the aim to reduce la­-
bour cost and boost economic growth. This new legislative frame-
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work predicts certain provisions for young people with more
characteristic among them the reduction of the minimum wage
for this age group. So, the new law (Law 4046/2012), derived from
the Memorandum 2, requires the general reduction of minimum
wages by 22% for all and by 32% for all workers under 25 re-
gardless of their occupation and sectoral agreement coverage
(Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance 2012). The reduction
of wages because of age characteristics (for those under 25)
con­stituted a significant facet of the labour market interven-
tions of the Greek governments and was justified on the basis
that young people have less experience and are therefore less
productive. In addition, a series of legal actions have over-
hauled basic features of the Greek employment landscape, trig-
gering a significant deterioration of working peoples’ rights.
Specifically, with the first Memorandum there was an increase
in the number of collective dismissals within one month (Ar-
ticle 74(1) Act 3863/2010), promotion of flexible employment
contracts with the reduction of part-time pay (Act 3846/2010),
extension of short-term and fixed-term work (Act 3846/2010
and Act 3986/2011), and derogation of the company level agree-
ments from sectoral and collective (3845/2010). The conditions
attached to the Second Memorandum in 2012 required unem-
ployment benefits to be reduced by twenty two percent, while
eligibility criteria were tightened and the duration of benefits
reduced (European Commission 2012). Social protection mea-
sures, including mini­mum income guarantees and extension of
benefits to long-term unemployed or new entrants to the
labour market, were proposed but were stalled by limited fi-
nancial resources (Adam & Papatheodorou 2015). Consequent-
ly, most young people remai­ned excluded from social protec-
tion, while the role of the family in protecting its young mem-
bers was undermined, with almost sixty percent of families
‘struggling’ as early as 2011. Legal scholars (Yannakourou &
Tsimpoukis 2014: 340) have criticized such reforms for discrim-
inating against young people’s rights as specified in the Eu-
ropean Social Charter. The Economic Affairs Commissioner
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argued that EU law did not apply to the agreements signed be-
tween Greece and the Troika. 
The main rationale behind such interventions was that the
Greek youth labour market is rather rigid and inflexible causing
external distortions to the ‘normal-market rate of pay’ and the­-
refore the entrance of young people to the labour market is
negatively affected. According to this argument, the high cost
of dismissal has created a divided labour force (insiders-out-
siders) whose interests are diametrically opposite as the insiders
are privileged by the EPL while the outsiders are excluded from
the labour market by it (Amable 2011). The solution suggested
for the resolution of this problem is the implementation of la­-
bour market reforms such as reduction of minimum wages,
flexible forms of employment and abolition and/or relaxation
of the EPL. In addition to that the positive correlation between
deregulation and competitiveness has been regarded as one of
the justifying factors for reducing wages for young people and
dismantling some of the rights and benefits assigned to them
in previous years. In the Greek economic crisis context despite
some opposition to that discourse there was a widespread
agreement between political parties and social partners (main-
ly employers) that wage cost is rather high and labour market
reforms are therefore necessary to reduce labour costs and
boost growth (Papadopoulos 2016b: 8). The process of internal
devaluation through a series of ‘labour market shocks’ could
be the appropriate policy response to reengineer economic
growth by closing the competitiveness gap created in the past
through an unreasonable increase in wages. Even though this
agenda has been portrayed as an outcome of the ‘tough line’
taken by the international lenders, it is undoubtedly the case
that many aspects of the labour market reforms have been
core elements of the proposals suggested by employers’ orga-
nizations (mainly SEV) long before the crisis (Papadopoulos
2016a: 504). In parallel, deregulating labour markets and re-
ducing labour costs have been explicit integral parts of the EU
policy particularly in the post-crisis period. 
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As depicted in the new EU framework wage developments
which support competitiveness, changes in EPL and social pro-
tection cuts need to be implemented in all European countries
regardless of their fiscal state and deficits. Within this frame-
work all Greek governments implemented harsh austerity mea-
sures and labour market reforms despite their allegedly un-
willing stance towards the latter. As demonstrated by the ex-
perience of the Syriza-Independent Greek government the EU
strict rules in combination with the pressures exercised by the
other international organizations-lenders left no space for aboli­-
shing or even mitigating some of the policies implemented un-
der conservative governments. The example of youth employ-
ment policies is indicative of this trend as the current govern­-
ment failed to restore the pre-crisis industrial relations and
employment model and maintained the legislative framework
enacted with the First and Second Memoranda. 
The impact of  crisis and the reforms on young people
The available data show that for a significant number of young
people living standards and social well-being have been rapid-
ly deteriorating since 2009 and until 2015 (Eurostat 2016). Be-
tween 2009 and 2013 the number of young people (age 15-29)
at risk of poverty or social exclusion increased from 26.5% to
43.2% while for the same period severe material deprivation
reached 26.9% from 12.3%. The above mentioned data make
probably more sense if they are correlated with the substantial
increase not only in unemployment rates but also in very pre-
carious, temporary and unstable working patterns among young
as well as older people. So, for instance the households where
young people live with low work intensity raised from 6.4% in
2009 to 18% in 2013. Similarly, widespread phenomena of
poverty and social deprivation are closely linked with the fact
that for many young people unemployment becomes a more
permanent state rather than just a temporary and transient
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passage. The trends in long-term youth unemployment (15-29)
exemplifies the above statement as for the 2009-2015 period
long-term unemployment (12 months or longer) has increased
from 6.4% to 26.6%. Furthermore, the qualitative change in youth
unemployment is depicted by that fact that the youth unem-
ployment ratio has increased from 9.8% in 2009 to 19.7% in 2015
demonstrating that young people represent a much higher por-
tion of unemployed than they did before the crisis. Even though
the rise in youth unemployment is running through all the dif-
ferent educational levels the available data show that unemploy-
ment for those with lower educational qualifications is higher.
For instance, the unemployment level of those aged 20-29 with
upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education has
skyrocketed reaching 40.6% in 2015 compared with 18.6% in
2009 (Eurostat 2016). In addition to that, since the eruption of
the economic crisis the number of young people that are nei-
ther in employment nor in education or training (NEETs) has
considerably increased especially for some age groups. More spe­-
cifically, in 2015 1 out of 5 people of the 20-24 age group belon­-
ged to the NEETs category while the overall increase in NEETs
among those aged 20-24 during the 2006-2015 period was 9.3%
(Eurostat Education, employment, both or neither). 
One element underlining the Greek labour market since
the crisis is the significant rise in the number of temporary jobs
and the subsequent decrease in full-time ones. As recent data
show between February 2009 and February 2016 the number
of people on full-time jobs has been reduced by 218.383 while
the number of those on temporary contracts increased by
220.655 for the same period. Due to the labour market reforms
and the introduction of sub-wages for young people through
legislative acts (reduction by 32 of national minimum wage) many
businesses tend to replace permanent and older workers with
cheaper younger ones (Hemerisia 2016). Thus, contrary to the
dominant discourse, Greek young people are facing a very nega­-
tive employment and social landscape characterized either by
extended periods of unemployment or fragmented, sporadic
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and transient moves to and out of employment. In any case, the
social indicators show that even when young people enter the
labour market the probabilities of securing a well-paid and dis-
sent job are close to zero while the traditional safety networks
like family have weakened to such an extent that young peo-
ple experience poverty, material deprivation and insecurity to
a much greater extent than in the past. 
Apart from the labour market reforms, the post-crisis suc-
cessive governments have introduced and implemented active
labour market measures to tackling youth unemployment by pro-
viding work experience to young people. However, there is am-
ple evidence that these policies have failed to tackle youth un-
employment mainly because their duration is rather limited
while at the same time the participants receive very low wages
and limited training. A case in point is the increasing use of
voucher to provide some theoretical and practical training to
young people with a view to help them get integrated into the
labour market in dynamic fields of the Greek economy. A re-
cent study (Papadopoulos & Bithymitris forthcoming) on the
use of voucher programs in tourism has showed however that
training opportunities even in dynamic service sector indus-
tries such as tourism rarely provide viable career paths for ‘the
participants and do not contribute to quality job offers, at least
not as long as the vocational culture reflects the sector’s pre-
disposition towards flexible contracts and flexible skill-sets and
mind-sets’. Other studies (Gialis et al. 2015: 4) have noted that
active labour market policies, primarily in the form of training
programmes introduced to combat unemployment, support the
reproduction of ‘very atypical’ jobs and contribute to –rather
than work against– insecurity. 
Responses of  unions to youth unemployment 
The offensive towards young people directed by a wave of youth
labour market reforms such as the reduction of minimum
wages for people under the age of 25, the extreme liberalization
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of the Greek youth labour market through the introduction of
very flexible forms of employment and the implementation of
various low paid youth programs has generated a very precarious
youth unemployment landscape that unions needed to respond
to. Previous research (Kretsos 2011) has examined the ways that
unions have responded to the very precarious employment con-
ditions experienced by young people focusing on the effective-
ness of certain initiatives and tactics to mobilize and organize
young people. Our focus will be mainly placed on the ideolo­-
gical aspects of the trade union’s interventions highlighting the
diverse ways through which youth unemployment crisis has
been approached by different sections of the labour movement.
Our objective is to unveil how the ideological and strategic ori-
entations of GSEE and PAME affect the ways that they com-
prehend and respond to the youth unemployment crisis and the
dramatic overhaul of the labour market regulations and social
protection provisions. 
The GSEE has responded to the above youth employment
reforms by adopting an anti-neoliberal position according to which
the severe deterioration of young peoples’ employment and social
rights is the outcome of youth neo-liberal policies promoted at
both European and domestic levels (GSEE, 2014). In the post-cri-
sis period, the GSEE (2016) has reiterated its opposition to supply-
side discourses highlighting the fact that the supply-side orien­-
tation of the governments’ proposals and employers’ positions are
unrealistic, ideologically biased and counterproductive as they
ignore the reality of the Greek youth la­bour market. For the GSEE
the problem of youth unemployment lies in the demand-side
of the labour market, and the­refore, demand-side measures
and policies are needed for tackling youth unemployment.
‘Youth employment growth can only kick off if austerity and
neo-liberal policies end. Competitiveness should rely on innova­-
tion, investments in new technologies and human capital and
not on low wages and deregulation as is currently the case’ (Scien­-
tific Advisor of the Labour Institute (INE) of the General Con-
federation of Greek Workers).
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The GSEE has also opposed the reduction of minimum wa­-
ges for young people introduced by the legislation act of the Me­-
morandum Agreements, claiming that the specific legislation
constitutes a discrimination against them and a violation of the
fourth article of the Constitution according to which all Greek
people have the same rights (GSEE 2012c: 8). In a petition to
the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, the GSEE con-
demned this legislative action and denounced a specific clause
according to which, all young people (regardless of their employ-
ment status and sectoral agreement coverage) are to be equal-
ly affected by it. The GSEE has also submitted an official re-
quest to the Council of the State asking for the abolition of the
legislative act through which the reduction of the minimum
wages and the individualization of the employment contracts
are promoted.
The GSEE has taken initiatives for social dialogue with em-
ployers in the direction of reinstating minimum wage setting
and signing a new collective agreement (To Vima 2012). How-
ever, these actions have not been particularly successful since
the pre-crisis minimum wages have not been retrieved while
further deterioration of young peoples’ rights has been observed
due the introduction of the labour market reforms and the launch
of very low paid, short-term and precarious employment pro-
grams. In addition, and more crucially, in 2013 the GSEE signed
the National Collective Agreement with the other employers’
associations that accepts the current reduced by 32 percent min-
imum wage levels for those under 25 years old specified by the
Memorandum Agreements. 
On the other hand, the PAME attributes the crisis to the
internal contradictions of the capitalist system and rejects that
a better management of the economy or a boost in the compe­-
titiveness can serve young workers’ interests. For that reason,
the measures taken –and accepted by the GSEE– for reducing
unemployment such as employment programmes and retaining
jobs (wage moderation, internal flexibility) through consensus
mechanisms have been considered by the PAME to be selling
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off workers’ rights aiming at reducing the price of labour pow-
er and depriving them of fundamental employment and social
rights (PAME 2014a).
The PAME has also denounced the reduction of minimum
wages as a deliberate capitalist strategy that aims to increase ca­-
pital profitability by squeezing the employment and social rights
of young people and severely discriminating against them. Ac-
cording to PAME, the wages for young workers are expected to
be further reduced as the new legislation authorizes businesses
to legally reduce minimum wages and skip sectoral and natio­-
nal agreements (PAME 2012d). Furthermore, for PAME the se-
vere deterioration of employment and social rights and the re-
duction of young workers’ wages under poverty will lead to a
severe drop in wages for all working people. 
In relation to the youth employment programs imple-
mented both in the pre and post crisis periods, the GSEE adop­-
ted a critical acceptance claiming that the lack of evaluation of
the Active Labour Market Policies and the frequent violation of
young people’ employment rights observed during the operation
of those programs needed to be addressed. The official strate-
gy of the GSEE was that employment and training programs,
if properly designed, targeted and implemented, can enhance
the employment prospects of young people and contribute to
reducing the unemployment rates. 
‘I am not against these programmes as long as they are very tar-
geted and specific. But there was never any evaluation of those
programmes in order to assess their effectiveness in creating
jobs for young people’ (Director of Institute of Labor of the Gene­-
ral Confederation of Greek Workers). 
The absence of any connection between different policies
(investment and research policies with employment policies),
was another criticism directed to the dominant youth employ-
ment policy paradigm. As an executive member of the GSEE
secretariat commended ‘training and learning programs for
young people should be integrated with the growth model and
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the needs of society and economy’. The same respondent, re-
flecting the enduring stance of the Confederation regarding
the economic-social foundations of such a model, stated that
tackling youth unemployment presumes the beginning of a de-
mocratically organized social dialogue among all the productive
and social forces, including employers. In the post-crisis the
GSEE insists that active youth employment programs can help
integrate young people into the labour market while it critically
accepts the very controversial training voucher scheme claiming
that social clauses and criteria can eliminate the inherent ten-
dency of those programs to downgrade young people’ wages and
employment rights. 
‘It is easy to reject everything, but you should be as realistic as
possible. We are in favour of policies, if they create new jobs and
help young people to enter the labour market. What we fear is
that there is no control system and some businesses use these
programmes to increase their profits’ (Institute of Labor of the
General Confederation of Greek Workers). 
Therefore, the active participation of the GSEE in various
active labour market programs and the consensus-based dis-
course produced by the union with regards to those programs
continues to characterise the stance of the union in the post-
crisis period despite the emergence of some radical rhetoric. 
For PAME, on the other hand, the active labour market po­-
licies have not helped young workers to acquire experience but
rather they have acted as a means for exploiting them and re-
placing regular staff with free youth labour favoring in that way
the large corporations (Rizospastis 2013). More specifically, the
PAME has criticized the Greek governments for using active
labour market policies as a means for reducing the labour cost
and offering employers’ cheap labour without any employment
or social rights. In 2013, the PAME participated in a mobilization
organized against the National Action Plan for Youth Unem-
ployment accusing the governments for attacking young peo-
ple’s right to stable jobs (PAME 2013a).
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‘The National Action Plan on ‘Employment’, announced by the
government, is a bomb in working relations, wages and collec-
tive agreements. They want to persistently beat the lower salary
regardless the already degrading reduction that exists today, to
suppress the young people even more. They want to destroy the
collective agreements’ (member of the Secretariat of Youth of
All-Workers Militant Front, PAME).
The PAME has also attacked the GSEE official strategy as
according to PAME’s representatives although GSEE condemns
the terms and conditions of those programs it doesn’t reject
their fundamental logic, leaving their exploitative nature un-
challenged (PAME 2013b). The stance of PAME is directly lin­-
ked to the Marxist routs of its programmatic foundations and
strategic orientation according to which youth unemployment
is the result of the capitalist system and its resolution can on-
ly be achieved through the organizing of young people with the
aim the overthrown of capitalism. As stated by the PAME in an
official document on the need for the participation of young
people to strike actions ‘the life and the movement of a trade
union, must care for the class orientated consciousness of young
workers and unemployed ones. A trade union should work to
enforce on the consciousness of every young person the sparkle
of organized reply to every workplace against the entire bour-
geoisie class and its domination’. In that respect youth unem-
ployment is understood as an outcome of a (capitalist) system that
produces and reproduces unemployment due to its destructive
and crisis-driven nature while it (capitalism) uses labour mar-
ket reforms and youth employment programs as a vehicle to
reduce labour cost and provide cheap labour to employers. 
One important question that needs to be addressed is how
unions explain youth unemployment and unemployment in
general. This question brings us to another set of questions re-
lated to the origin of the crisis and the suggested policies-mea-
sures to overcome it. For the GSEE youth unemployment is the
result of a specific model of economic management, that of ne-
oliberalism, which destabilizes the employment relationship,
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deregulates the labour market and dismantles the wage settings
mechanisms through wages and working conditions used to be
regulated at least since the second world war. This liberalization
of the economy manifested in many countries including Greece,
coupled with asymmetries factored within the Eurozone in
favour of some countries and at the expense of others. The debt
crisis is then perceived as the outcome of those asymmetries
since Greece was one of the losers of the uneven balance ac-
counts that were shaped between EU countries due to gaps in
competitiveness and the inability of some countries to increase
competitiveness through currency devaluation. Within this nar-
rative labour market reforms and liberalization measures tar-
geting young people are being perceived by the GSEE as a de-
liberate policy informed by an ideological bias towards dereg-
ulation that ignores the realities of the Greek economy and is
therefore rather counterproductive in generating economic
growth. In this way for GSEE youth unemployment is the out-
come of failed neoliberal policies that underestimate the posi-
tive weight that institutions and high wages could have for
triggering economic growth. 
What needs to be addressed, according to the GSEE, is the
need of the Greek economy for innovation, productive re-
structuring and skill formation (GSEE 2015). The latter can en-
hance productivity and offset any negativities produced by in-
creased wages and centralized wage settings processes. Since
the crisis, the GSEE has recognized though the need to nego-
tiate wage concessions or even reductions accepting the nar-
rative that defensive strategies for negotiating workers’ condi-
tions and rights is the only way forward. In a sense GSEE ac-
cepts elements of the dominant discourse that Greek economy
suffers from a competitiveness gap whose treatment is para-
mount to any exit from the predicaments currently facing an
increasing number of working people and mostly felt by young
people. So, although GSEE parts ways with the neoliberal ideo­-
logy, and in fact quite often criticizes it, it is also the case that
it legitimizes aspects of the current narrative by associating
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economic growth with the improvement of working conditions
without problematizing the nature of the capitalist economy and
its tendency to deteriorate employee’s rights as means for over-
coming the crisis and re-establishing high profitability levels.
So, the change of economic and productive model is a prere­-
quisite to build a social system that reconciles the interest of
capital and labour in a mutually beneficial way that could help
young people to find good jobs avoiding the contradictions in-
herent in more neo-liberal versions (GSEE, 2016). The insistence
on the ideological obsessions of political and economic elites
together with the absence of reference to endogenous and
structural factors that relate to the class nature of the employ­-
ment relationship demonstrate the supremacy of economic and
social integration goals over class or transformative discourses
that move beyond the current capitalist system. Thus, the
GSEE perceives the current crisis as an episode of mismana­-
gement or as a break of a social contract whose origin is lying
on political failures and businesses’ greedy behaviours. The
generation of a stable fiscal and macroeconomic environment
together with increases in domestic demand through productive
restructuring in favour of certain sectors are seen by GSEE as
necessary ingredients for tackling the crisis and the high unem­-
ployment rates (GSEE 2016). 
On the other hand, the PAME offers an entirely different
reading of the economic crisis arguing that the latter is the re-
sult of the internal contradictions and crisis-driven nature of
the capitalist system manifested in overaccumulation and over-
production crises. The latter result in the destruction of the pro-
ductive forces (capital and labour power) and high unemploy-
ment rates that can be only overcome by a new stage of capital
accumulation based on reduced wages and benefits for working
people. According to this narrative the austerity measures speci­-
fied through the Memoranda agreements is the means through
which the capitalist class endeavor to solve the crisis by de-
creasing the price of labour power and the social benefits en-
joyed by workers when the capitalist economy was in upsurge.
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So, austerity measures are not seen by PAME as the trigger of
the crisis but rather as a way utilized by the capitalist states to
increase the competitiveness of their economies by reducing
the price of the labour power and dismantling all the hard-won
social and employment rights (PAME 2017a) Therefore, for
PAME the Greek labour movement should reject the strategy
of class collaboration promoted by GSEE and adopt a class con­-
flict strategy oriented towards politicizing working people’
struggles with the goal to overthrow the capitalist system. Due
to the belief that the economic growth will be based on workers’
reduced wages and benefits in many occasions PAME has poin­-
ted out that any economic growth will not be accompanied by
better wages and working conditions as the latter need to be
sacrificed for the arrival of that growth (PAME 2017b). Subse-
quently, PAME contends that Greece should write off its debt,
exit the European Union and euro and nationalize key sectors
of its economy. The stance of PAME is directly linked to the
radical-Marxist routs of its programmatic foundations and strate-
gic orientation which perceive youth unemployment as the re-
sult of the capitalist system and thus its resolution can only be
achieved through the organizing of young people with the aim
to overthrow capitalism. As stated by the PAME in an official
document on the need for the participation of young people to
strike actions ‘the life and the movements of a trade union, must
care for the class orientated consciousness of young workers
and unemployed ones. A trade union should work to enforce
on the consciousness of every young person the sparkle of or-
ganized reply to every workplace against the entire bourgeoisie
class and its domination’.
A battle has also erupted between PAME and GSEE con-
cerning the stance of the movement towards the state and the
employers. The PAME openly accuses GSEE for betrayal of
working class people including young people due to the con-
tinuing reliance on social dialogue mechanisms to ‘protect
workers’. PAME often cites the signature of the national col-
lective agreement by GSEE in 2014 through which the reduced
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minimum wages were accepted. The GSEE argued that this
move was made to protect the institution of collective agreements
and the family benefits that many employees rely upon. At the
same time the GSEE criticizes PAME for maximalist and unrea­-
listic proposals that cannot be materialized within the constraints
imposed by the current very unfavorable economic and politi-
cal system. For PAME on the other hand working class people
should fight for retrieving the pre-crisis losses demanding the
fulfilment of their needs. These different ideological stances
seem to be the determinants for comprehending the different
ways through which GSEE and PAME have attempted to for-
ward their demands in relation to youth unemployment. For in-
stance, the youth secretariat of GSEE has not been active in or-
ganizing young people since their main activity has concen-
trated on meetings with either leaders (meeting with Merkel)
or with communication with Ministries to express their dis-
comfort with the policies for young people (PAME 2014b). On
other hand PAME has been rather active in mobilizing young
people (either employed or unemployed) at the same time con-
demning the GSEE youth secretariat for not organizing young
people and making false promises to young people that their
problems will be solved through social dialogue with the state
and the employers. 
Undoubtedly, the stance of GSEE and PAME is just an ex-
ample of a division within the labour movement that existed
even from the very beginning of trade unionism and took a
more specific form at the start of the 20th when anti-capitalist
forces became much stronger. The manifestation of this divide
in the Greek case becomes clearer when we examine the ways
that GSEE and PAME comprehend the social reality and en-
visage an imagined one. For instance, in a letter on the state of
the Greek movement the secretary of the Confederation stresses
the need for a more vibrant and dynamic movement that orga-
nizes working people and aims to protect its rights. More cru-
cially the letter recognizes that GSEE is the organization in charge
of protecting the employment rights and wages of working peo-
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ple and it should not be undertaken tasks and duties falling un-
der the radar of political parties. The ‘economism’ of GSSE
position is rather evident in that instance since unions are per-
ceived as economic actors whose duty is to advance the intere­-
sts of their members. The rather moderate and defensive tac-
tic of compromise taken by GSSE and manifested in wage cuts
concessions has been rather disproportionate to the drastic de-
terioration of workers’ rights due to governments’ policies and
employer’s, practices. In addition to that the demand-side Key-
nesian-type policies proposed by GSSE are signals that the ma-
jority in the Confederation still believes that societal problems
like youth unemployment are the results of ill-designed poli-
cies of neoliberal inception that dried economies and favored
certain classes. For that reason, the GSSE supports the view that
economic growth and competitiveness are the central pillars for
tackling youth unemployment crisis if policies start being orient-
ed towards more growth-friendly fiscal policies. Therefore, the
GSSE reading of the crisis is distant from anti-capitalist ideas
and movements for which inherent tendencies of the capitalist
system including the over-accumulation of capital trigger the
destruction of productive powers like human labour causing high
unemployment rates. In addition to that and more crucially
the above-mentioned position is accompanied by an explicit ac-
ceptance that social dialogue and collaboration continue to be
the main pillars upon which the labour movement should re-
ly to advance the rights of Greek working class people. 
On the other hand, for PAME unions need to combine po-
litical and economic battles unmasking the actual workings of
the capitalist system and the inadequacy of pure economic bat-
tles to advance the position of workers given that within cap-
italism workers can only reduce the rate of exploitation but not
abolish it. For that reason, PAME calls on the working-class peo-
ple to demand a retrieving of the working conditions and wages
that they used to receive before the crisis. Asking for better wages
and working conditions in a rather militant way but within an
anti-capitalist platform underpinned by clear references to the
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class nature of this society and the need for a new socialist so-
ciety where the productive forces will be under the workers’
ownership and control. The PAME very active stance on orga-
nizing campaigns and other initiatives with the aim to retrieve
the pre-crisis employment framework and employers anti-
labour strategies is in clear contract with the GSEE strategy (Bi­-
thymitris 2015). PAME has insisted on the need to organize la­-
bour battles with a focus on restoring the collective bargaining
framework and the minimum wage levels that existed before
their significance reduction in 2012 (PAME 2016). Contrary to
the very defensive position taken by GSEE, PAME has refused
to accept the dominant narrative that working class people should
wish or expect the economy recovery so that some of their
losses can be compensated since that the very nature of that
recovery is conditioned on the dismantling of working class
rights and wages (PAME 2016). 
Conclusions
The article presented an overview of the economic crisis and
youth unemployment in Greece with a focus on identifying the
changes in the legislative level enacted with the introduction
of the two Memoranda. In addition to that the article presented
some up-to-dated data regarding the experiences of young peo-
ple since the crisis and the specific ways through which labour
market reforms influence the social and employment conditions
of young people. It is evident that young people can be fairly
considered as one of the age groups that has been hard hit by
the crisis and the policies of internal devaluation as in the last
seven years all the social and employment indicators for young
people have been steadily deteriorating. The prevalence of very
flexible employment contracts in combination with the rise in
poverty levels and inactivity signify a new youth employment
landscape whose main dimensions such as flexibility, low pay and
temporariness serve the interests of employers but seriously
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undermine the needs and interests of young people. For that
reason, the conditions experienced by young people remind
us that the divide between capital-labour is still relevant to ana­-
lyze the content and direction of policies especially in a reces­-
sionary and unstable period. Thus, the generation of growth has
been relied, as it seems, on a constant dismantling of estab-
lished social and employment rights while the discussion on the
qualitative aspects of that growth such as pay levels, employ-
ment rights, social protection has been constantly losing ground.
The illustration of youth employment figures shows however
that any serious engagement with the topic of youth unemploy-
ment in Greece needs to be firmly based on a discussion of
whether young people’s needs for full-time and well-paid jobs
can be served by a market economy that is guided by profit-
making concerns. From our analysis, it becomes rather clear that
the need for overcoming the crisis and boosting competitive-
ness are explicitly linked, in both policy and discourse levels,
with the need to make young employees more flexible, adaptable
and cheap. Thus, our initial assumption that the inherent con-
tradictions of capitalist system can be hardly overcome have
been supported by the evidence presented in this article. Our
analysis also identified how trade unions have responded to
youth unemployment crisis and found that within the Greek
labour movement there are two main tendencies whose ideo-
logical and political orientations are evidently in conflict. In the
preceding analysis, we showed that the different conceptual-
ization of youth unemployment as well as the diverse policy
proposals for its resolution are associated with the diverse
strategic and ideological orientations of the two main trends ex-
pressed in GSEE and PAME. Their conflict over youth unem-
ployment stems from the old but not old-fashioned division be-
tween social-democratic and socialist strategies and their dif-
ferent views on whether labour market problems such as youth
unemployment can be resolved within the existing socio-eco-
nomic system. 
167ECONOMIC CRISIS AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 09:27:36 |
References
Adam, S. & C. Papatheodorou (2015). ‘Dismantling the feeble so-
cial protection system of Greece: Consequences of the crisis and
austerity measures’, in K. Schubert, P.D. Villota & J. Kuhlmann
(eds), Challenges to the European Welfare Systems. New York:
Springer.
Amable, B. (2011). ‘Morals and Politics in the Ideology of Neo-Lib-
eralism’, Socio-Economic Review 9(1): 3-30.
Bithymitr i s, G. (2016). ‘Union militancy during economic hard-
ship: The strike at the Greek steel company “Hellenic Halyvour­-
gia”’, Employee relations, 38(3): 373-389.
Dedoussopoulos, A., V. Arani tou, F. Koutentakis & M. Ma­-
ropoulou (2013). ‘Assessing the impact of memoranda on the
Greek labour market and labour relations’, ILO Governance
Working Paper 53. Geneva: ILO.
Dietr ich, H. (2013). ·Youth unemployment in the period 2001-2010
and the European crisis: Looking at the empirical evidence’,
Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 19(3): 305-
324.
European Commission (2012). ‘The Second Economic Adjustment Pro-
gramme for Greece’, March. European Economy Occasional Pa-
pers 94. Brussels: European Commission.
Eurostat (2012). ‘Unemployment statistics’, news release euro-indi-
cators, 155/2012–31 October 2012. 1 November, epp.eurostat.ec.
europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC /3–31102012-BP/EN/3–31102012-BP-
EN.PDF. [accessed 10/08/2016].
Eurostat (2015). Being Young in European today. Luxembourg: Pub-
lications Office of the European Union. 
Eurostat (2016). ‘Database population and social conditions: Youth’.
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/youth/data/database [accessed
10/10/2016].
Gal l ie, D. & S. Paugam (2000). Welfare Programmes and the Ex-
perience of Unemployment in Europe. Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press.
Gial is, S. & L. Leontidou (2014). ‘Antinomies of flexibilization and
atypical employment in Mediterranean Europe: Greek, Italian
ORESTIS PAPADOPOULOS168
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 09:27:36 |
and Spanish regions during the crisis’, European Urban and Re-
gional Studies. E-pub ahead of print August 2014 DOI: 10.1177/
0969776414538983.
GSEE (2012a). Annual Report 2012: The Greek economy and em-
ployment [Ετήσια Έκθεση 2012: Η ελληνική οικονομία και η
απασχόληση], Athens, INE/GSEE-ADEDY.
GSEE (2012b). ‘Statement by the President of GSEE after the Social
Dialogue’ [‘Δήλωση του προέδρου της ΓσΕΕ μετά τη συνάντηση
με τους εργοδοτικούς ϕορείς’].
GSEE (2012c). ‘Circular, n. 1. To labour federations and labour cen-
tres controlled by GSEE’.
GSEE (2014). ‘GSEE to Angela Merkel: “We lose the most important
human capital of our country because of your destructive poli-
cies”. [‘Χάνουμε το πιο σημαντικό ανθρώπινο κεϕάλαιο της
χώρας από τις καταστροϕικές πολιτικές σας’].
GSEE (2015). Annual Report 2015: The Greek economy and employ-
ment [Ετήσια Έκθεση 2015: Η ελληνική οικονομία και η απα -
σχόληση], Athens, INE/GSEE-ADEDY. 
GSEE (2016). Annual Report 2016: The Greek economy and em-
ployment [Ετήσια Έκθεση 2016: Η ελληνική οικονομία και η
απασχόληση], Athens, INE/GSEE-ADEDY. 
Guardian (2016). ‘UK workers on zero-hours contracts rise above
800,000’. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/09/uk-
workers-on-zero-hours-contracts-rises-above-800000. 
Hemerisia (2016). ‘Unemployment has risen at 23,2%. They fire the
“old guard” for young people with lower pay’ [‘στο 23,2% η
ανεργία - απολύουν την «παλιά ϕρουρά» για νέους με χαμηλότερο
μισθό’]. http://www.imerisia.gr/article.asp? catid=26516&subid=
2&pubid=114178935 [accessed 01/10/2016].
iefimerida (2016). ‘Δημοσκόπηση: απογοητευμένοι και οργισμένοι 8
στους 10 Έλληνες’ http://www.iefimerida.gr/news/289953/dimo­-
sko­pisi-apogoiteymenoi-kai-orgismenoi-8-stoys-10-ellines
Kretsos, L. (2014). ‘Youth policy in austerity Europe: the case of
Greece’, International Journal of Adolescence and Youth 19(1):
35-47. 
Koukiadaki, A., & C. Kokkinou (2016). ‘Deconstructing the Greek
system of industrial relations’ European Journal of Industrial Re -
lations, 22(3): 205-219.
169ECONOMIC CRISIS AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 09:27:36 |
Matsaganis, M., M. Ferrera, L. Capucha & L. Moreno (2003).
‘Mending Nets in the South: Anti-poverty Policies in Greece,
Italy, Portugal and Spain’, Social Policy & Administration 37 (6):
639-55.
Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance. (2012). ‘Circular no. 4601/
304/12-3-2012 for the implementation of paragraph no. 6 of ar-
ticle no. 1 of law 4046/2012’ [Eγκύκλιος αριθ. 4601/304/12-3-2012,
για την εϕαρμογή της παρ. 6 του άρθρου 1 του N. 4046/2012’],
Hellenic Democracy. 
PAME (2012a). ‘Down with the dictatorship of the monopolies’, Workers
Counterattack, 3, March. 
PAME (2012b). ‘No more sacrifices for the plutocracy’ [‘Όχι άλλες
θυσίες για την πλουτοκρατία’].
PAME (2012c). ‘Intervention of the All Workers’ Militant Front
(PAME), on behalf of the European Office, at the 2nd Youth
Conference of the WFTU’. 
PAME (2012d). ‘All new employees in 511 euros gross’ [‘Όλοι οι νέοι
εργαζόμενοι στα 511 ευρώ μεικτά’].
PAME (2013a). ‘Struggle against the Action Plan for the exploitation
of young people. στηρίζουμε την κινητοποίηση του Μασ στις 24
Γενάρη 14.00 μ.μ. We support the mobilization of the Μασ in
January 24 14:00 στα προπύλαια Propylaea’ [‘αγώνας κόντρα
στο σχέδιο Δράσης για την υπερεκμετάλλευση των νέων. στη -
ρίζουμε την κινητοποίηση του Μασ στις 24 Γενάρη 14.00 μ.μ.
στα προπύλαια’].
PAME (2013b). ‘For the voucher program entrance to the labour mar-
ket’ [‘Για το πρόγραμμα «Επιταγή Εισόδου στην αγορά ερ -
γασίας’].
PAME (2014a). ‘Commentary on the GSEE meeting with the govern-
ment on the occasion of the meeting of the government em-
ployment council’ [‘σχόλιο για τη συνάντηση της ΓσΕΕ με την
κυβέρνηση, με αϕορμή τη συνεδρίαση του κυβερνητικού συμ -
βουλίου απασχόλησης’].
PAME (2014b). ‘Commentary from the Youth Secretariat on the occasion
of the meeting of new European trade unionists with Merkel’.
PAME (2016). ‘PAME recommendations for collective agreements’
[‘Εισήγηση στην ημερίδα του παΜΕ για τις συλλογικές συμ -
βάσεις εργασίας’].
ORESTIS PAPADOPOULOS170
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 09:27:36 |
PAME (2017a). ‘We will not be spectators in our misery. All at the
February 21 rally at 6.30 pm in Omonia’ [‘Δε θα γίνουμε θεατές
στην εξαθλίωσή μας. Όλοι στο συλλαλητήριο 21 Φλεβάρη στις
6.30 το απόγευμα στην ομόνοια’].
PAME (2017b). ‘All in the general strike on the 17th of May’ [‘Όλοι
στη γενική απεργία στις 17 Μαΐου’]. 
Papadopoulos, T. (2006). ‘Support for the Unemployed in a Fa­-
milistic Welfare Regime’ in M. Petmesidou & E. Mossialos (eds),
Social Policy Developments in Greece. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Papadopoulos, O. (2016a). ‘Youth unemployment discourses in
Greece and Ireland before and during the economic crisis: Mov-
ing from divergence to “contingent convergence”’, Economic
and Industrial Democracy, 37: 493-515.
Papadopoulos, O. (2016b). ‘Economic crisis and youth unemploy-
ment: Comparing Greece and Ireland’, European Journal of In-
dustrial Relations: 0959680116632326.
Papadopoulos, O. & G. Bithymitr is (forthcoming). ‘Vocational
habitus in liminal contexts: The case of training vouchers in the
Greek tourism sector’.
Pohl, A. & A. Walther (2007). ‘Activating the disadvantaged. Vari-
ations in addressing youth transitions across Europe’, Interna-
tional Journal of Lifelong Education 26: 533-553.
Rizospastis. (2013). ‘For programs targeting unemployed young peo-
ple’ [‘Για τα προγράμματα που απευθύνονται σε άνεργους
νέους’]. http://www.rizospastis.gr/story.do?id=7744256
Scarpetta, S., A. Sonnet & T. Manfredi (2010). ‘Rising youth un-
employment during the crisis’, OECD social, employment and
migration working papers, Paris: OECD.
Sefer iades, S. (2003). ‘The European employment strategy against
a Greek benchmark: A critique’, European Journal of Industrial
Relations 9(2): 189-203.
Thetoc.gr (2016). ‘Dijsselbloem: This is why I admire Alexis Tsipras’
[‘Ντάισελμπλουμ: Να γιατί θαυμάζω τον αλέξη Τσίπρα’]. http://
www.thetoc.gr/politiki/article/ntaiselmploum-na-giati-thaumazw-ton-
aleksi-tsipra
Yannakourou, M. & C. Tsimpoukis (2014). ‘Flexibility without se-
curity and deconstruction of collective bargaining: The new para­-
171ECONOMIC CRISIS AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 09:27:36 |
digm of labor law in Greece’, Comparative Labor Law & Poli-
cy Journal 35(3): 331-370.
Zambarloukou, S. (2007). ‘Is There a South European Pattern of
Post-Industrial Employment?’, South European Society and Poli -
tics 12(4): 425-442.
ORESTIS PAPADOPOULOS172
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 09:27:36 |
